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THE COMPETITIVE IMPACT OF SMALL GROUP
HEALTH INSURANCE REFORM LAWS
Mark A. Hall*

This Article reports on findingsfrom an extensive study of small group health insurance market reforms in seven states, enacted during the early 1990s. After
summarizing the content and purpose of these reforms, this evaluationfocuses on
the impact these reforms have had on the nature and degree of market competition.
The principalfindings are: (1) small group health insurance markets are highly
competitive, both in price and in product innovation and diversity; (2) although
some insurers have left some or all of these states in part because of these reforms,
an ample number of active competitors remain, even in heavily regulated states;
(3) in some of the more heavily regulated states, competition is very thin in less
populated areas, especiallyfor indemnity insurance; (4) the rapidgrowth in managed care in the small group market may have been precipitatedby these reforms;
(5) standardized benefit plans have not achieved their objectives; and (6) competitive forces still focus to a considerable extent on risk selection techniques and
hardly at all on the quality of care.

INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

This study evaluates how small group health insurance reform
laws have affected the nature and extent of competition among
insurers.' The study focuses primarily on selected state laws
Professor of Law and Public Health, Wake Forest University. J.D. 1981, University
*
of Chicago Law School. An earlier version of this Article was presented at the University of
Pennsylvania Institute for Law and Economics "Roundtable" on Managed Care, and this
article was substantially written while I was a visiting professor at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. This research was supported by a grant from the Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation. The findings, conclusions, and analysis are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Foundation. Many people, too numerous to name, gave me thoughtful
comments and critique during various phases of this research. My colleague and collaborator, Elliot Wicks, deserves special thanks for helping me to think more clearly about these
issues and for making this work so enjoyable.
As we begin, a word or two is required about terminology. Health insurance, like
1.
any other industry, has a specialized vocabulary with terms of art that sometimes differ from
common understandings and that often are used inconsistently within the industry, due in
part to regulatory differences among the states. For our present purposes, simplicity is valued over precision, so this Article will use a lay vocabulary that glosses over many of the
distinctions that are important within the industry. Thus, "insurer" includes, generically,
both indemnity and HMO plans. "Managed care" refers primarily to HMO plans, including
point-of-service plans. In contrast, "indemnity" means both traditional unconstrained fee-forservice plans as well as more managed forms of indemnity such as preferred provider organizations (PPOs). "Insurance agents" refers mainly to independent agents, sometimes
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enacted in the early 1990s, but this research also provides some
preliminary evaluation of small group portions of the federal
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 2 which took
effect in 1997. This study looks at various small group market reforms in seven states: Colorado, Florida, Iowa, New York, North
Carolina, Ohio, and Vermont. The principal reforms studied are:
(1) guaranteed issue and open enrollment, (2) renewability and
portability, (3) rating bands and community rating, (4) restrictions
on underwriting practices such as risk selection and pre-existing
condition exclusions, (5) purchasing cooperatives, and (6) reinsurance and risk adjustment.
This intensive case study was conducted primarily through more
than 100 semi-structured in-depth interviews in 1997 and 1998.
The primary sources of information in each state were insurance
regulators, insurers (commercial, nonprofit, and HMOs),
agents/brokers, public and private purchasing cooperatives, reinsurance pool administrators, and trade associations.3 Also,
extensive documentary data and information sources were collected through multiple sources, including insurers, regulators,
agents, and newspapers and other academic and public policy studies. Finally, a market testing study was conducted to determine the
ability of an actual small employer and unhealthy individual to obtain insurance. These multiple sources of information and data
were analyzed using both qualitative and quantitative techniques.4
Part I reviews the history, purpose, content, and logic of these
reforms and summarizes the concerns raised by opponents. Part II
presents the study's findings with respect to the impact of these
reforms on market competition. Part II first addresses market
called brokers. The terms "premium," "price," and "rate" are used interchangeably to refer
to the cost of insurance. Finally, "health insurance" means comprehensive major medical
policies, in contrast with more limited or specialized coverage. Other, more technical terms
will be defined later in the context in which they are important.
2.
Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
3.
Interviews lasted approximately one to two hours each and were based on an interview guide, but the discussions were free-ranging and the interviewers covered a variety of
topics. Interviews were conducted primarily by the author, who is the principal investigator,
and by Elliot Wicks, Ph.D., who is a consultant to the project, with the assistance of Janice
Lawlor, M.P.H., project manager. Most interviews were in person and one-on-one, but a
number were over the phone and in groups of two to five subjects. See Mark A. Hall, An
Evaluation of Health InsuranceReform Laws: The Views of National Insurers (last modified Apr. 6,

1999) <http://www.phs.wfubmc.edu/insure/NatIns/> (on file with the University of Michigan
Journalof Law Reform).
4.

form

See Mark A. Hall & Janice Lawlor, Wake Forest University Health Insurance Market Re-

Study

(last

modified

Apr.

21,

1999)

<http://www.phs.wfubmc.edu/insure/

reports.html> (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform) (providing the

full collection of lengthy research reports, each focusing on a specific state).

The Competitive Impact

SUMMER 1999]

structure in terms of the concentration of firms involved in the
movement to managed care. Next, Part II separately examines the
key dimensions of competition-price, product design, and quality. Part II concludes with a look at the continuing role that risk
selection plays in the competitive dynamic.

I.

HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET REFORMS

A. The Impetus for Reform

Health insurance market reforms were enacted across the country in the early 1990s in response to growing concerns that the
market for individual and small groups was rapidly disintegrating
and that market behavior was undermining the social objective of
universal coverage.5 Problems first began to appear in the individual market for insurance sold outside the workplace. This end of
the market has always been plagued by fairly severe adverse selection. Younger, healthier individuals often decline to purchase
insurance until they or a family member anticipate significant expenses such as the birth of a child or the onset of a chronic disease.
Those who purchase individually, therefore, tend to be at significantly greater risk for health care costs than those insured through
employer groups. This raises the price to a level that many individuals cannot afford or are not willing to pay unless they know
they are likely to use the benefits. Similar problems have also begun to spread to the small group market: that portion composed of
smaller employers, where the group size creates the same problems
of biased selection. At first, these problems affected only employers
with ten or fewer workers, but significant selection problems have
begun to affect firms of twenty-five and more.
To counteract adverse selection and to offer more attractive
prices, insurers have long used a number of practices, known generically as medical underwriting, which limit the availability of
health insurance. First, they have rated applicants according to
5.
See generally MARK A. HALL, REFORMING PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE (1994)
[hereinafter HALL, REFORMING HEALTH INSURANCE]; Mark A. Hall, Reforming the Health
Insurance Market for Small Businesses, 326 NEW ENG. J. MED. 565 (1992) (discussing the purposes of reforms in the small-group market and the likely effects of the reforms); Mark A.
Hall, The Political Economics of Health Insurance Market Reform, HEALTH Arr., Summer 1992
(discussing the purpose and likely effects of reforms in the small-group market). See also
Linda Blumberg & Len Nichols, First, Do No Harm: Developing Health Insurance Market Reform
Packages, HEALTH Air., Fall 1996 (presenting four health insurance reform packages that
could improve insurance market performance without aggravating risk selection problems).
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their individual age and health status, which can price insurance
out of the reach of older or chronically ill people. Second, to
discourage subscribers from enrolling only when they are ill, insurers have imposed pre-existing illness provisions that offer insurance
but do not cover for a defined period those health conditions that
existed any time during the prior six to twelve months before enrollment. This makes health insurance much less attractive to
subscribers who are sick or have sick family members. Still, many
would choose to pay the premiums for a year or more in order to
be covered thereafter. Insurers, therefore, have declined to cover
high-risk individuals or groups or they have excluded altogether a
designated set of health problems, such as cancer or asthma, a
practice known as "ridering out."
A second problem created by pre-existing exclusion clauses is
that once employees have fulfilled the waiting requirements, they
are reluctant to switch to a new employer with another insurer and
start all over. This can create a condition of 'job-lock" in which
mildly but chronically ill employees, or those with sick family
members, are frozen into their present positions by the fear of losing insurance benefits if they switch jobs.
Some health insurers were also accused of "churning." This is
the practice of offering deep discounts to new subscribers after extensive medical underwriting, based on their initial good health
profiles, and then imposing extreme price increases of 50 to 100%
or more after a year or two of coverage, or refusing to renew altogether. Frequently, these price increases or terminations were not
based on any actual adverse claims history but instead reflected the
"wearing off' of the predictive power of the initial screening.
Medical underwriting tends to wear off by virtue of the statistical
phenomenon known as "regression to the mean," according to
which unusually good risks tend over time to become normal risks
simply by the operation of the law of averages. Claims costs also rise
over time simply because the initial pre-existing condition periods
expire. After failing to anticipate these increased costs in their initial pricing, some insurers were offering unrealistically low prices at
the outset and then imposing steep price increases on renewal,
forcing many subscribers to search elsewhere for affordable coverage.
In sum, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, we witnessed what
some have characterized as a not-so-gradual unraveling of the private market, beginning at its smallest (individual subscribers and
very small employer groups) and progressing to medium-sized
firms and larger. The task that state and federal lawmakers faced
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was how best to weave these frayed ends of the health insurance
rope back together at the same time that they were seeking to create mechanisms that would restrain health care costs.
Out of these multiple concerns and objectives arose a barrage of
state legislation attempting to shore up the market for private
health insurance. Between 1991 and 1996, all but four states enacted significant legislation that affects the pricing or marketing of
private health insurance. This was followed in 1996 by the federal
law known as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA).6 This Article focuses on the aspects of these laws that
apply to the small group market, which is typically defined as employers with fifty or fewer workers. This somewhat restricted focus
is essential because the structure and economics of the individual
and group markets are fundamentally different. 7 The individual
market is much smaller (accounting for less than 10% of private
health insurance), individual insurance is not subsidized by employers, and it does not receive the same favorable tax treatment as
employer-based insurance. Most importantly, the economics operate much differently when insurance is purchased by groups
because this greatly minimizes the tendency (known as "adverse
selection") for people to buy health insurance only when they expect to use it, and group purchase improves bargaining power and
economies of scale.
B. The Logic and Content of Reforms

1. The Purpose of Reform-Health insurance reforms have multiple
purposes, but they all tend to converge on one central goal: to create a market dynamic that will both promote health insurance
coverage and limit health insurance costs. This broad objective has
a number of subsidiary components, which include increasing insurance availability and affordability, reducing risk selection and
6.
110 Stat. at 1936. HIPAA standardized many aspects of state small group reform
laws by setting uniform requirements for guaranteed issue, renewability, and portability for
small groups. It also required states to adopt some mechanism that enables subscribers leaving group coverage to maintain individual coverage.
7.

See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. HEHS-97-8, PRIVATE HEALTH

INSURANCE: MILLIONS RELYING ON INDIVIDUAL MARKET FACE COST AND COVERAGE TRADE-

OFFs 6 (1996) (noting that individual and employer sponsored markets differ substantially);
Deborah J. Chollet & Adele M. Kirk, Understanding Individual Health Insurance Markets
(Mar. 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law
Reform) (noting the differences in consumer entry in and exit from individual versus group
insurance markets).
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medical underwriting, "leveling the playing field" among insurers
of different types, and stabilizing the market. Others view the
purposes of reforms in political terms, as a means to improve the
functioning of the private market to lessen the threat of a complete government takeover, or in some instances to force other
members of the industry to compete on their terms.
Thus, there is no single, cohesive view that characterizes all insurance reform efforts. Some reformers view the existing market
structures and practices as generally acceptable and socially responsible, except for certain excesses that give the industry a bad
name. This view tends to prevail among smaller, indemnity-based
insurers. Other reformers, however, have more sweeping goals.
Such reformers feel that private insurers are dissipating too much
of their competitive energies in socially unproductive or counterproductive efforts to screen, select, and measure individual health
risks. These reformers think that the private health insurance market would serve its best social function if insurers would quit
competing on the basis of risk selection and begin competing on
the basis of risk management. This viewpoint is obviously more
sympathetic to larger, managed care insurers.
According to this second viewpoint, risk selection has its strongest economic function where insurance behaves in the classic
fashion of reducing risk by pooling large numbers of subscribers
with similar risk profiles. Risk selection has its strongest social purpose when the risk in question is controllable, so that the cost of
insurance motivates efforts to reduce the risk. These are some, but
not the central, functions of health insurance. Health insurance
pools not only attempt to enhance statistical predictability of uncertain events through the law of large numbers, but also to pool
the known costs of predictable health risk through health insurance spread across a heterogeneous pool of both healthy and sick
people, for both routine and catastrophic expenses. Health insurance has thus become in large part a pre-paid financing
mechanism for predictable health care expenses. Moreover, many
of the genetic and environmental factors that influence health risk
are not controllable by individuals, so it is seen as unfair and unproductive to vary insurance cost by risk status. The more
fundamental reformers, therefore, believe that insurers serve their
most useful social function by covering as many people as possible
and by setting prices to reflect their ability to control the underlying costs of treatment rather than their ability to accurately
measure and project those costs. Reforms enacted with this mindset were intended, in part, to harness the energies that private
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insurers previously applied to assessing individual health status
(medical underwriting) and redirect them toward managing the
costs of treatment. The purpose of this Article is to assess whether
these reforms have achieved this particular set of purposes and
whether they have improved or hampered the degree of competition in general.
The details of insurance market reforms vary considerably but
the reforms share four essential components: (1) guaranteed issue
and continuity of coverage, (2) rating bands and community rating,
(3) purchasing cooperatives, and (4) administered reinsurance or
risk adjustment. These laws also vary in their scope: most states define small groups as employers with two to fifty workers, but a
significant number cover a hybrid category between small groups
and non-groups known somewhat paradoxically as "one-life" groups.
These are self-employed individuals who purchase insurance
through their businesses. The following overview is based on the
common features of this set of laws across all fifty states.
2. Guaranteed Issue and Continuity of Coverage-The starting
point of reform is to make sure that any willing purchaser has access to insurance and can retain that insurance through
subsequent renewal periods. "Guaranteed issue," also known as
open enrollment, requires all insurers who participate in the small
group or individual markets to accept any applicant.' An important
distinction exists between states that require only designated policies to be guarantee issued and those that require this of all
policies. Prior to HIPAA, only fifteen states had imposed the
broader requirement, but since 1997 states have conformed their
laws to HIPAA, which requires all small group policies to be guarantee issued.9 HIPAA, however, applies only to groups of two to
fifty employees, and many states retain the limited guaranteed issue requirement for the self-employed.
Where guaranteed issue applies only to some policies, it is usually to one or more standardized plans with benefits set by a
government committee. Typically, these so-called "state-mandated"
plans come in a very basic version or with a standard or common
benefits package. Versions of each often exist for both indemnity
and HMO products.
8.
Guaranteed issue describes a continuous open enrollment requirement. Open enrollment usually describes a limited period of guaranteed issue. See HALL, REFORMING
HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 5, at 35.
9.
For a more extensive discussion, see Jack A. Rovner, Federal Regulation Comes to Private Health Care Financing: The Group Health Insurance Provisions of the Health Insurance
Portabilityand Accountability Act of 1996, 7 ANNALS HEALTH L. 183 (1998).
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Enabling any group to obtain insurance is coupled with a "whole
group" concept, which requires the employer to offer coverage to
all individuals within a group. This prevents employers from angling for lower cost policies by excluding sicker individuals in the
group and minimizes the selection problems that result if healthier
individuals are allowed to drop out of the risk pool and purchase
individual insurance.
Continuity of coverage once varied considerably among the
states, but it is now mostly uniform for small groups as a result of
HIPAA. Individual states, however, are still permitted to impose
requirements that are more demanding than the federal law. As a
result, insurance market reform laws promote continuity of coverage in three ways. First, insurers are prohibited from refusing to
renew insurance except for fraud, nonpayment, or similar malfeasance. Insurance theory tells us that, once good and bad risks are
pooled together randomly and remain together and a fair premium is set, actuarial soundness does not require that insurers be
able to drop the bad risks as claims accrue. Moreover, if insurance
does not remain available when the need for it arises, it is not attractive either to the sick or to the healthy.
The second aspect of continuity is the regulation of pre-existing
condition exclusion clauses. Insurers are prohibited from ridering
out specific health conditions altogether. Under HIPAA, they are
allowed for small group insurance to place only an initial twelve
month pre-existing exclusion on any condition manifested within
six months before the date of coverage. This restriction recognizes
that some form of pre-existing exclusion is necessary in a market
where the purchase of insurance remains voluntary. The preexisting exclusion counteracts the tendency of subscribers to delay
purchase until they are sick.
Third, these reforms address the problem of job-lock that arises
when employees are afraid to change jobs for fear of having to undergo an additional exclusion period. The reforms promote the
portability or continuity of coverage by requiring that subscribers,
once enrolled, be permitted to transfer coverage to a new insurer
without undergoing a new exclusion period, so long as the gap in
coverage does not exceed two months.
Again, the logic is that of adverse selection. If insurance is acquired in a setting that is demonstrably not driven by selection
concerns, such as a change of job, risks should distribute themselves evenly and predictably, and therefore no special protection
against adverse selection is required. Insurers should be able to
cover their risks simply by setting an appropriate initial premium.
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Also, easing the ability to switch is critical to allowing insurers to
compete on the basis of price and service quality.
3. Rating Restrictions--Guaranteed issue and continuity of coverage eliminate the worst effects of medical underwriting-denial
of coverage, job lock, and churning. Standing alone, however, they
would increase price variations and fluctuations by forcing insurers
to take on the most extreme risks and allowing them to price their
policies accordingly. Therefore, the second component of the reforms is to construct a variety of rating restrictions that compress
the degree of price variation among subscribers. HIPAA purposefully does not impose rate restrictions, leaving this to state law.
States have adopted various restrictions that compress the range of
prices an insurer can charge across its entire book of small-group
business at any point in time.
States use three basic approaches to rating restrictions: rating
bands, adjusted community rating, and pure community rating.
While each requires successively greater degrees of rate compression, the key distinguishing factor of each approach is the extent to
which insurers may incorporate health characteristics in their rates,
in addition to other allowable "case characteristics" such as age and
gender. Rating bands allow insurance companies to consider
health status when setting rates, but only to a defined extent above
or below the mid-points. States originally allowed ranges of plus or
minus 25 to 35%, but many have since tightened the range to plus
or minus 10 to 20%. Prohibiting rate variation based on individual
health status is called "modified community rating." This is
"modified" or "adjusted," rather than pure, community rating because full or substantial adjustment is still allowed for age and
sometimes gender factors. These states also sometimes permit adjustments for other factors such as the employer's industry or
whether employees smoke.
Pure community rating eliminates most of these other factors
(including age/gender factors) and retains only location and family size as rating factors. Some states with this form of community
rating are not totally "pure," to the extent that they allow some
small additional rate variation. The critical distinction is whether a
state greatly constrains age and gender factors because these can
result in rate variations of five-fold or more, even if individual
health status is entirely removed. As a consequence, considerable
rating flexibility remains even in states with modified community
rating or tight rating bands. Because each allowable factor can be
added to each of the others, and because demographic factors can
be large, at the extreme these restrictions still allow more than a
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ten-fold difference in the rates charged groups at either end of the
possible combinations of risk factors. On the other hand, these distant outliers might be very rare.
4. PurchasingCooperatives-As a partial solution to many of the

inefficiencies in the small group market, states have created public
purchasing cooperatives or have authorized varying forms of private purchasing groups. These purchasing cooperatives contract
with insurers who agree to abide by certain marketing and pricing
rules. The core idea is to streamline the marketing function and to
form a larger risk pool in a fashion that creates for small groups
the same bargaining clout, administrative expertise, and employee
choice that are typically available to large employers. This Article
will touch only briefly on this aspect of the reform laws.
5. Reinsurance or Risk Adjustment-The final component of these

laws is an administered reinsurance mechanism that allows insurers
to reinsure any risks that are expected to generate costs exceeding
the prices that they may charge. Reinsurance encourages insurers to
willingly accept all applicants by allowing them to pass their worst
risks over to an industry-funded reinsurance pool. This outlet suppresses the incentive to engage in risk selection in various indirect
and surreptitious ways such as targeted marketing, gerrymandered
benefit packages, selective poor service, or field underwriting
(informal screening by agents). This administered reinsurance
mechanism differs from conventional, private market reinsurance
because it is used selectively for groups or individuals that are expected to be higher risks than the allowable premium reflects. In
contrast, conventional reinsurance covers all of an insurer's risk pool
for the unpredictable chance that an actuarially accurate premium
will not be sufficient 0 Commercial reinsurance also does not have a
redistributive funding mechanism to spread the excess loss across
the industry through a market-share based assessment.
An alternative approach is a system of mandatory, administered
risk adjustment in which insurers with lower risk pools make transfer payments to those with higher risks, according to a specified,
objective measure of risk. In theory, this approach is more accurate
and fine-grained than reinsurance, but the techniques for making
the required measurements are relatively undeveloped and untested, so risk adjustment is used only on a limited basis in a few
states.

10.

For an insightful discussion that makes many of these same points, see Randall R.

Bovbjerg, Reform of Financingfor Health Coverage: What Can Reinsurance Accomplish?, 29 INQUIRY

158 (1992).
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6. Summary of Small Group Laws-There is wide variation across
the states in how to combine different versions of these dimensions
of insurance market reform. This Article reports on findings from
seven states, which reflect a range in the stringency of these laws.
This chart summarizes the core features in each state prior to
HIPAA, in decreasing order of stringency.
STATE

New York

GUARANTEED ISSUE

RATING

All products, 3-50

Pure community

Groups of 1-2 can be

rating

sold either as groups
or individuals
Vermont

All products, 1-50

Nearly pure
community rating

Florida

All products, 1-50

Colorado

Statutory plans, 2-50

Modified community

rating
Rate band of +/-20%,
phased down to 0%
(modified community
rating)

N. Carolina

Statutory plans, 1-50

Rate band of +/-20%

Iowa

Statutory plans, 2-50

Rate band of +/-25%

Ohio

Limited open

Rate band of +/-35%

enrollment, 2-25; 1
month/year for
HMOs, and .5% of
book of business for
_

indemnity

Colorado, Florida and North Carolina have state-wide public
purchasing cooperatives, and New York and Ohio have localized
private purchasing cooperatives. Colorado, Florida, Iowa, North
Carolina, and Ohio have reinsurance pools, and New York uses a
risk adjustment mechanism.

C. The Dangers of Reform

These reforms have attracted some vocal critics who warn about
possible adverse consequences and a number of quieter voices who
warn against setting hopes too high. The greatest fear is that these
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reforms will be counterproductive because they could increase
prices and decrease coverage. These reforms may raise prices because they make insurance most attractive to the highest risk
subscribers by holding prices to less than the policy's actuarial
value. The excess is built into the premiums paid by all purchasers,
which will inevitably drive an undetermined number of lower risk
purchasers out of the market, thus further raising the average
price. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection against the
market as a whole. This potential exists because the decision to
purchase insurance remains voluntary and existing purchasers are
thought to be highly price sensitive.
Critics most vehemently oppose pure community rating because
it has the most severe rate compression, and therefore, has the
greatest potential to drive out younger, healthier subscribers. Pure
community rating, critics fear, will result in not simply a one-time
loss in coverage, but an escalating, destabilizing dynamic that may
cripple the market. When the first round of subscribers drops out,
the community rate increases, forcing still more cycles of subscriber drop outs and subsequent price increases, setting into
effect an adverse selection spiral that eventually would result in insurance so expensive that almost no one would buy it.
A related concern is that adverse selection will occur among insurers. Even if the market as a whole does not lose enrollment,
some insurers, either by luck of the draw or due to systemic or strategic patterns, could suffer a greater loss of subscribers or attract
higher risks, resulting in some insurers going out of business. This
loss of enrollment affects not only their private welfare, but could
compromise market competition if too many insurers fold or withdraw. This form of biased selection can occur because good and
bad risks do not always sort themselves randomly among competing insurers. Instead, attributes of some insurers' plans attract
healthier patients and other attributes attract sicker patients. For
instance, patients who have strong ties with their physicians because of their medical histories may be more hostile to the
restrictions in choice of providers imposed by managed care plans
such as HMOs. Conversely, younger and healthier patients with no
established physician relationships, or without anticipated heavy
use of medical services, find these restrictions to be less of an inconvenience. On the other hand, patients who anticipate larger
medical expenditures might prefer the lower deductibles and copayments that are typical of HMOs. Therefore, there is considerable
debate over the extent to which indemnity plans systematically attract riskier patients than do HMOs. Similarly, subscribers who have
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mental illness will naturally gravitate toward plans with this coverage, and patients with chronic illness will be more attracted to
packages that offer generous pharmacy benefits.
Insurers are able to engage in countless techniques to encourage this strategic behavior to their benefit. Some are devious and
improper, using strategies such as poor claims service for sicker
patients, or what is known as field underwriting-tacit encouragement of field agents to keep high-risk applications from ever
reaching the home office. Other techniques are quite innocuous.
Well-baby visits and an ample supply of pediatric specialists tend to
attract young subscribers, and specialists in sports medicine may
attract healthy subscribers. Lesser coverage of prescription drugs
discourages very sick patients, and deleting from an HMO's drug
formulary certain very expensive specialty drugs used to treat rare
conditions will obviously deter subscribers who suffer from those
conditions. Simply choosing one advertising medium over another
or marketing more aggressively in one geographic area over another is likely to produce a varied mix of age and health status.
Similarly, the managed care plan's location strongly influences the
plan's attractiveness to different populations' choice of treatment
facilities.
In sum, biased selection can occur both naturally, through patients' choice among different benefit packages, and artificially
through insurers' calculated use of covert selection devices. Insurance reforms heighten this potential because they prevent insurers
from accurately pricing according to anticipated medical costs.
This is worrisome behavior that, at a relatively low level, may need
to be policed. If it occurs on a larger scale, certain insurers may be
forced artificially to leave the market or certain desirable insurance
products and benefits packages may be withdrawn. Part II evaluates
the extent to which these various beneficial purposes and potential
harms have in fact occurred.
II.

THE EFFECTS OF SMALL GROUP MARKET REFORMS

The following assessment of the law's impact begins with an
overview of the general impact of small group market reforms on
market structure. It then examines the movement to HMOs, and
the impact on price competition. Non-price competition is discussed next, in terms of both standardization versus diversification
in product offerings, and a focus on quality of care. This assessment concludes with a look at which risk selection techniques
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survive reform and whether insurers have found tactics for circumventing these laws.
A. General Competitiveness and Market Concentration

The small group health insurance market in each of these states
has been highly competitive over the past several years, as evidenced in a number of ways. First, numerous interview subjects
held the nearly uniform opinion that these markets have been
highly competitive. Most insurers see the market as offering good
opportunities for increased sales but believe that they face stiff
competition. Insurance agents are also enthusiastic about the impact of the law on their business because guaranteed issue makes it
easier for them to sell insurance. This holds true even in New York,
which has the most stringent law. Favorable comments include a
statement by a New York agent that the law has been "a real boon
to [our] business.... I'd venture to say our business has increased

50% to 60% at least. It was wild." Another said the law
helped us tremendously because we were able to bring our
rates down. Everybody said that [community rating] would
put people like us out of business ...

because people didn't

need us and this and that and the other thing. I hate to tell
you our business has quadrupled.... I saw it as a marketing
opportunity because I think a lot of people fell asleep and
really didn't keep on top of what was going on. So there was a
lot of opportunity for businesses throughout most of Manhattan because it's right here on our fingertips to go in and
explain what was going on with community rating, explain
what the options were [to purchase insurance at uniform
rates, regardless of age or health status].
Small group reforms have been especially successful in expanding market options for micro-sized groups (groups of five or fewer
employees) extending down to self-employed individuals. Prior to
reforms, many insurers never sold to micro-sized groups, or offered
only individual coverage. Micro-sized groups are seen by insurers as
inherently less desirable due to greater marketing and administrative expense and greater adverse selection. Following reform, market
options have "improved tremendously" for groups under ten, and
especially for those under five. Some insurers attribute much of their
recent enrollment growth to these micro-sized groups. Evidence of
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this can be seen in the fact that average group size has dropped
sharply for a number of insurers. Nationwide, enrollment growth
has been the strongest for groups under ten.1
Market competitiveness can be measured structurally in terms of
the number of competitors and the degree of market concentration. While there has been some degree of market consolidation in
most of these states because a number of insurers have dropped
entirely out of the small group market or have ceased actively soliciting new business, the number of insurers that remains is ample to
produce a strong competitive dynamic. In most of the study states,
the portion of the market held by the top three to five insurers has
remained about the same following reform. Although the largest
insurers (usually Blue Cross plans) have remained at or near the
top, significant movement into and out of
the top ranks has oc2
curred, indicating that the market is fluid.1
In many states, we heard or observed that there are fewer competitors now than a few years ago, especially among indemnity
insurers and in rural areas. New York, for instance, saw an "exodus"
of dozens of insurers when reform was enacted, and Florida and
Vermont each lost a dozen or more. We solicited views on why the
number of insurers has diminished. Several subjects explained that
two forces are at work. First, a wave of consolidations and mergers

11.
See Gail A. Jensen & Michael A. Morrissey, Small Group Reform and InsuranceProvision by Small Firms 1989-1995, 36 INQUIRY 176 (1999); see also Thomas C. Buchmueller & Gail
A. Jensen, Small Group Reform in a Competitive Managed Care Market: The Case of California 1993
to 1995, 34 INQUIRY 249, 257 (1997); Gail A. Jensen et al., The New Dominance of Managed
Care: Insurance Trends in the 1990s, HEALTH AFF., Jan./Feb. 1997, at 131 (finding that pointof-service plans, defined as all HMOs, PPOs, and managed care plans have recently become
the dominant form of health insurance provided by both small and large employers).
12.
For example, in North Carolina, the total number of insurers registered to sell
small group insurance grew from 60 in 1992-1993, to 73 in 1996-1997. See Mark A. Hall, An
Evaluation of North Carolina'sSmall-Group Health Insurance Reform Laws (last modified Feb.
1999) <http://www.phs.wfubmc.edu/insure/northcarolina/index.html> (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter Hall, North Carolina Evaluation].
Over this time, market concentration has remained virtually the same. In 1992, the top 10
insurers had 77% of the market and the top three had 55%, compared with 73% and 53%
in 1997. See id. Only four companies have stayed consistently in the top 10, although the top
two companies have remained unchanged. See id.
This is not the case in all markets, however. For instance, in Florida, although there are a
large number of insurers registered to do business, market concentration has increased
following reform. See Mark A. Hall & Elliot Wicks, An Evaluation of Florida'sSmall-Group Health
Insurance Reform Laws (last modified Dec. 1998) <http://www.phs.wfubmc.edu/insure/
florida/index.html> (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform)
[hereinafter Hall & Wicks, FloridaEvaluation]. In 1993 about 50% of the Florida small-group
market was held by the four largest insurers. See id. In 1998, however, the top half of the
market was composed of only two firms, and only five insurers had more than 5% of the
market. See id.
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has taken place among insurers, mostly HMOs. 13 Second, national
insurers have become more selective of markets on which to concentrate. This is especially true for indemnity insurers. The first of
these forces appears unrelated to the reform laws. Our subjects
believe the second force, however, is partially related to these laws.
Several indemnity insurers explained that, prior to reform, they
considered themselves to be national companies and so would
market in virtually every state, even if they had very small market
shares. Following reform, these insurers gave up this "mile wide
and inch deep" philosophy in favor of selecting those states and
regions within states where they believed they could compete most
effectively. This concentration occurred partly in reaction to increasing competition from HMOs and an increasing amount of
capital resources necessary to develop managed care networks.
This strategy, however, also resulted from experience under the
reform laws. As explained below, indemnity insurers found that
they could compete more effectively under some versions of these
laws than under others. Although few insurers said that there are
any versions of the small group reforms they are completely unwilling to accept, most insurers said that the regulatory environment is
one factor they now consider in deciding whether or not to remain
or become active in a state. Thus, insurers view states as having
both regulatory and business risks and opportunities.
One insurer who specializes in small group insurance first said it
would withdraw from New York because of pure community rating,
but then decided to remain.14 The primary reason was a clarification about the impact of the law on its one-to-two life groups,
which allowed it to keep its existing subscribers in these microsized groups without having to write new business for this group
size. Similarly, one indemnity insurer told us that guaranteed issue
for groups as small as self-insured individuals was one of several
factors in its decision to withdraw from the Florida market. Another indemnity insurer explained that it initially embraced small
group reforms in a proactive manner, even in the toughest states,
with the philosophy that it had to learn to compete against the re13.

SeeJanet Corrigan et al., Trends Toward a National Health Care Marketplace, 34 IN-

11, 18 (1997).
14.
This insurer is headquartered in New York and has a significant block of business,
so it would "take an act of God" for the carrier to have to leave the market. The only alteration in the legal environment this insurer could easily imagine that would change its mind
would be an "all-markets" law like the one in New Jersey and the one in New York that applies to HMOs, which requires all group insurers to sell in the individual market. See Mark A.
qUIRY

Hall, An Evaluation of New York's Health Insurance Reform Laws (last modified Mar. 25, 1999)

<http://www.phs.wfubmc.edu/insure/new-york/index.html> (on file with the University of
MichiganJournalof Law Reform) [hereinafter Hall, New York Evaluation] .
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forms in order to survive. But it found after about two years that its
losses in some states were unacceptably high, and it began a concerted effort to determine which regulatory environments were
more accommodating.
Few insurers, however, placed primary blame on the small group
laws for their decisions to withdraw from any of the study states.
One small group insurer that withdrew from New York attributed
this decision in part to the law, but also to its lack of a good agent
network and the fact that its existing block of business was perceived as having problems. Also, this is an indemnity company that
was consolidating and withdrawing from small group markets in
other parts of the country in response to increased competition
from managed care. Another insurer, one with both indemnity and
HMO products, remained in New York but withdrew from Vermont and Kentucky, states with similar laws, because the market
potential in New York was so much greater and constituted such a
large portion of the insurer's existing business. The three largest
insurers we spoke to continue to compete in most states regardless
of how the small group laws are constructed.
This degree of consolidation does not necessarily undermine
competition. Much of the attrition of insurers comes from those
with very tiny market shares who were not "committed" to the market,15 so that the competition among those who remain is much
fiercer. According to one Florida agent:
[Small group reform] really took a lot of the players out of
Florida. A lot of the insurance companies that were writing
small groups from one to fifty lives in Florida decided that
they didn't want to abide by all these regulations and be controlled by the state. Therefore they pulled their product out
or they pulled out of the state of Florida completely. So over

15. All of these study states except Vermont have over 50 insurers in the market, and
some have over 100, but in most of these states, only a dozen or so insurers have more than
a few thousand covered lives. See Mark A. Hall, An Evaluation of Colorado'sSmall-Group Health
Insurance Reform Laws (last modified Dec. 1998) <http://www.phs.wfubmc.edu/insure/
colorado/index.html> (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform)
[hereinafter Hall, Colorado Evaluation]; Mark A. Hall, An Evaluation of Ohio's Small-Group"
Health Insurance Reform Laws (last modified Dec. 1998) <http://www.phs.wfubmc.edu/
insure/ohio/index.html> (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform)
[hereinafter Hall, Ohio Evaluation]; Mark A. Hall, An Evaluation of Vermont's Health Insurance
Reform Laws (last modified Dec. 1998) <http://www.phs.wfubmc.edu/insure/vermont/
index.html> (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform) ; Hall, North Carolina Evaluation, supra note 12; Hall, New York Evaluation, supra note 14; Hall & Wicks, Florida
Evaluation, supra note 12. For instance, in 1994 the Ohio small group market was composed
of 83 insurers, although only 20 had more than 2500 covered lives.
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the last three years we're really getting down to the cream of
the crop. The ones that are really going to stay in it for the
long haul....
An article in a New York business journal recounted one year after
reform:
As for the fear that New Yorkers would be trampled by insurance carriers running for the state line, the stampede isn't
even a minor traffic jam. "The massive exit from the market
didn't happen," reports [an Insurance Department researcher] .... "All the major players are still here."
Despite these generally competitive conditions, there are other
indications that reform laws may have dampened competition. Although a large number of insurers remain in the market in each
state, some insurers do so only marginally, in order to keep the
business of renewing subscribers, but they do not offer rates that
attract new subscribers. Rating rules limit the extent to which insurers can set lower rates for new versus renewing business. If an
insurer cannot offer a competitive community rate, then it faces
the choice of either canceling all of its small group business and
leaving the state entirely, or keeping its renewing subscribers and
setting rates high enough to anticipate the adverse selection that
inevitably affects a block of business that is not attracting new subscribers. The consequence is that many insurers technically in
these markets do not effectively contribute to price competitiveness or diversity in product offerings.
A further limitation is that, with the market consolidation that
has occurred in recent years, insurers are focusing their marketing
efforts more selectively among metropolitan or rural areas. Although indemnity insurers are usually licensed to sell anywhere in
the state, they make strategic decisions about which cities or counties justify the costs of developing agent networks. Moreover,
HMOs are usually licensed only in those portions of the state in
which they have developed provider networks. Because of the large
capital investment required to develop provider networks, HMOs
are even more selective than indemnity plans.
As a consequence, the level of effective competition in one area of
a state may be much less than in others and may not be accurately
conveyed by the total number of registered insurers. In New York,
for instance, there are forty insurers selling in the mid-Hudson region of the state, but only twenty-six selling in the Buffalo area. Some
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Ohio agents said they are getting quotes for small groups from only
three to four insurers compared with eight to ten in the past. One
Florida agent explained:
[I]n Tallahassee [the reform law has] had a very adverse effect. We had numerous carriers who would write business
here [before the law], and [now] we're down to just a hand
full of carriers that will even do business in Tallahassee or that
are even competitive.... Principal is the only one [left] that is
a large name carrier. The rest of them are smaller carriers not
as highly rated on Best ratings.
These perceptions may be due in part to agents' preferences for
indemnity versus managed care. The agent just quoted, for example, appears to be speaking primarily of indemnity offerings and
does not address the fact that there are several new HMOs competing in the Tallahassee market. Others do not view the reduction in
effective competition as a response to the reform law but instead as
a consequence of market consolidation driven by other economic
forces, including the rapid movement to managed care, the topic
to which we next turn.
B. Managed Care
There are several possible reasons the law might have helped to
precipitate the move to managed care and the resulting pricecompetitiveness. First, HMOs are accustomed to offering open
enrollment and modified community rating; reform laws helped to
level the playing field by requiring indemnity insurers to do business
on the same terms as managed care. Second, to the extent reform
laws cause any rate shock effect, they may have provoked subscribers
to look around for alternatives more quickly than if prices had
climbed more gradually. 16 Third, employers' ability to switch insurers
is attributable in part to the portability provisions in the law.
These speculations were confirmed by several interview subjects
and sources of data. As discussed more below, indemnity prices
indeed rose steeply in states with more stringent reforms, at least
for some insurers. Some insurers with HMO products said the

16.
A rate shock might exist for a substantial portion of the market even if average
rates did not increase, because community rating has offsetting effects at the high- and lowrisk ends of the market.
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reform law was directly responsible for making the small group
market a "major target" for their HMO products or for their HMO
competitors by focusing more attention on this market segment,
which previously had been largely overlooked. According to one
New York agent
[y]ou could have almost foretold the eventual movement toward the HMOs and PPOs because there was no other way to
go. In that respect perhaps [the disruptive effects of the law
were] good. It financially forced everyone to go toward managed care where everyone was basically trying to fight
managed care.
On the face of things, then, the small group reform laws have
been a great success in terms of reorienting the market toward
competition based on managing costs rather than selecting risks.
Risk selection has been largely eliminated by requiring guaranteed
issue and prohibiting most forms of risk rating. Whether this appearance reflects reality will be explored more below. Also,
whether these are positive or negative developments depends in
large part on one's view of managed care. A negative view, held
both by many consumers and many indemnity insurers, is that insurers should not be in the business of making medical decisions
and thus competitive forces should not focus primarily on success
in containing medical costs. Regardless of one's views, it is very
clear that, following the enactment of these laws, managed care
has become a dominant force in the small group market. According to one industry source in Florida, "[t]he whole game has
changed. It used to be underwriting, risk selection and claims investigation; now it's networks and managed care." In most of our
study states, HMO market share doubled or tripled in just two or
three years following reform, and most of these states have seen a
noticeable growth in smaller, new HMOs serving local markets.
It is debatable whether the reform law is responsible for the
movement to managed care. Most interview subjects opined that it
is not because this movement occurred in states with and without
reforms. A study based on a representative national sample of approximately 2000 employers found that managed care plans
(HMOs, PPOs, and point-of-service) tripled their share of the small
group market in two years, increasing from 22 to 69% between
1993 and 1995.17 These researchers concluded, based on a regres17.
SeeJensen et al., supra note 11, at 127 ("In firms with fewer than fifty workers the
percentage of insured workers with conventional coverage fell from 78 to 31% from 1993
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sion analysis, that this movement was unrelated to the reform laws
but instead was due to the growing presence of managed care in
the large group market and the price advantage offered by managed care over indemnity. Similarly, in our study states with low
managed care penetration-Iowa and Vermont-the greater success of indemnity products appears unrelated to the structure of
the reform law and to be determined more by inherent market
conditions. Both states lack large urban concentrations and have
significant populations in rural areas that do not easily support
competing managed care networks.
The view that reform laws did not precipitate the movement to
managed care is confirmed by the market testing study described
above, in which an actual small employer contacted eighteen
agents in each of the study states to inquire about the availability of
health insurance, using a designed scenario.'8 The market testing
firm recorded whether the agents offered or recommended traditional indemnity or managed care products. Grouping these
responses by the intensity of insurance market reforms in each
state, 9 there are no statistically significant differences in the proportion of agents offering or recommending managed care
products, as displayed in the following table. In states with the
lightest regulation, however, agents were more than twice as likely
to offer only indemnity insurance, although only a small portion of
agents did so (15% versus 6%). This provides some support for the
view of insurer subjects, discussed below, who said that looser rating rules are more accommodating to indemnity insurance. The
small sample sizes involved in this study, however, kept even this
difference from being statistically significant.

and 1995."); see also Michael A. Morrisey & Gail A. Jensen, Switching to Managed Care in the
Small Employer Market, 34 INQUIRY 237 (1997).

18.
This type of actual market testing is an established form of evaluation that provides
powerful insight into actual commercial behavior. Its weakness in this instance is that, due to
concerns over insurance fraud laws and the lack of funds to make actual purchases of insurance, the market tester was able only to inquire about the availability of coverage and was
not able to submit an application. See Hall, ColoradoEvaluation, supra note 15.
19.
New York and Vermont are classified as heavy regulation states, Iowa and Ohio as
light regulation states, and the remaining states (except North Carolina, which was not included) as medium regulation. In this portion of the study, Minnesota and New Mexico are
also included, and are classified as medium regulation states. See Hall, supra note 3
(classifying states into categories of "strong," "medium," and "weaker" based on the strength
of their reform laws).
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AGENTS' PREFERENCE FOR MANAGED CARE OVER
INDEMNITY, BY INTENSITY OF REFORM
INTENSITY OF INSURANCE
MARKET REFORMS'

Agents Recommending Managed

0

HEAVY

MEDIUM

LIGHT

81%

83%

71%

14%

23%

12%

6%

6%

15%

Care Products
Agents Offering Only Managed
Care Products
Agents Offering Only Indemnity
Products

The finding that high managed care penetration is unrelated to
the degree of small group regulation is confirmed by most of our
interview subjects, who viewed the small group market as simply
the next logical place for HMOs to look for sales growth after the
large group market became saturated.21 The struggle for a foothold
in the market led to fierce price competition. There are other indications, however, that reform laws have facilitated or precipitated
competitive conditions. Small employers' embrace of HMOs
largely coincides with nationwide market reform laws. Although
the nationwide regression analysis mentioned above did not show a
statistically significant correlation with these laws, it did show a
positive relationship between insurance reform and managed care
growth, and these researchers speculated that these laws might
have "set the stage" for managed care growth.

See Hall, supra note 3.
20.
Also, there are other, more technical explanations relating to unique regulatory
21.
conditions. For example, one interview subject made a forceful argument that HMOs are
desperate for market share because they must increase their private enrollment in order to
take on more Medicare and Medicaid enrollees under a rule no longer in effect that required at least 50% private enrollment. This subject attributed the intensified HMO
competition in the market directly to this motivation, because the larger group market was
much more saturated with managed care than the small group segment. See Hall & Wicks,
Florida Evaluation, supra note 12. In New York, the increase in HMO enrollment might be
attributed to a unique regulatory treatment that HMOs received for a time with respect to
negotiating hospital discounts. New York maintained all-payor rate regulation through 1995,
which required indemnity insurers to pay regulated hospital rates; only HMOs negotiate
discounts, giving them a competitive advantage. See Hall, New York Evaluation,supra note 14.
22.
See Morrisey & Gail, supra note 17, at 237.
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C. Price Competition

1. Price Trends-Across all of these states, we saw similar, but not
identical, price trends. Between 1993 and 1996, HMO prices increased very little, or actually declined, but indemnity-based
products increased at high single-digit or low double-digit rates. In
1999, however, rates for HMOs and indemnity-based products increased dramatically."
Precise quantitative description of market-wide prices is difficult
because premiums vary by so many factors that there is no easy or
accepted way to average across all the different products and risk
groupings for even a single insurer, let alone the entire market.
Also, most states do not systematically collect or report rate information, so even if such a calculation were possible, the data do not
exist. In several states, therefore, simpler proxy indicators of price
must be used, depending on the information available. 4 In some
states (Colorado, New York, and Vermont), good data was available
for actual median prices for representative products from all insurers. In all study states, we also collected subjective views about
prices from agents and actuaries, whose expertise is acutely sensitive to trends in prices.
Health insurance premiums for small employers held remarkably steady during the first few years of reform, especially compared
with the double-digit increases that were common in the late
1980s. For example, Colorado reported market-wide rate decreases
or increases in the low single digits during the first two years of reform, and in New York rates for most insurers increased only in the
mid-single digits from 1994 to 1996. One Florida agent commented
that "it seemed like when health care reform came in ... the pricing [became] very, very favorable and still is." One indicator of
price competition is the high loss ratios that many market leaders
experience for small group business. New York law, for
instance, encourages insurers to maintain substantial loss ratios by
23.
See Michael Meyer, Oh No, Here We Go Again, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 14, 1998, at 46
(stating that in 1999, medical insurance rates will increase from about 8% on average, to
20% or more).
24.
Typically, the closest proxy is to calculate the average premium per employee for
several years following reform. This is an average across all small groups and all products for
each insurer. The median figure among the top insurers is a good indication of market
trends. See Hall, supra note 3. It is important to stress that these premium figures are not
adjusted for any changes in benefits. Average premiums might hold steady only because
benefits are being pared back, such as by increasing deductibles or lowering coverage for
prescription drugs. In our interviews, we heard that some of this is occurring, but we also
heard that some insurers were increasing benefits. See Hall, Ohio Evaluation,supra note 15.
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waiving rate review hearings if loss ratios exceed 75%. This regulatory impetus is largely unnecessary at present, however, because
price competition has forced loss ratios for most insurers into the
high seventies or low eighties.
These changing trends may be due to the rapid increase of
HMO enrollment in the small group market, which may have produced adverse selection against indemnity plans. The increase in
HMO enrollment resulted in large increases for indemnity plans,
while fierce competition for HMO market share may have held
prices artificially low for HMOs. Many subjects spoke of HMOs
"buying market share" in the mid-1990s, meaning they were pricing at or below expected costs in order to build the subscriber
bases needed to establish new managed care networks. These subjects explained that steeper increases in the late 1990s have been
necessary to maintain long-term profitability.
Nevertheless, most subjects, including agents, confirmed that
the small group market is highly price competitive. The rates of
leading insurers "are all right in line with each other." In most
states, most of the market share among top insurers was held by
those insurers whose average premiums were near or below the
median for the top insurers. The overall impression, then, is that
the small group market is competitive and rational with respect to
price. One pricing actuary commented that he is "constantly
amazed" at how small a price difference can induce employers to
switch insurers; some will switch for as little as one dollar per employee per month.
Whether this achievement is due to the reform law is still debatable. It is clear that these laws did not cause the premium spirals
that many critics warned were possible because of adverse selection
against the market. Some degree of adverse selection may have occurred, but moderate price increases indicate that it has been
minimal and easily absorbed without adding noticeably to the price
of the leading insurance products. According to one Florida agent:
[E]verybody was afraid that their rates really were going to go
up and they didn't. In fact, they stayed the same or went
down. Because what was happening at the time was managed
care was becoming more and more popular and ... managed

care [had] provisions that made it much more cost effective,
and that was passed on to the consumer. And so, if there was
any increase because of the new guidelines, it was washed out
because of the market change.
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This raises the possibility, however, that the full effects of small
group reforms have not yet been felt. Now that steeper price increases are being imposed, adverse selection might begin to take its
toll more noticeably.
2. Price Shopping and Market Volatility-There is some debate
over whether or not this degree of price competitiveness is positive.
Some subjects believe that reform, in combination with other factors, has produced an unhealthy degree of market volatility.
Others, however, think that occasional price wars can be good for
consumers. Whichever view is correct, it is clear that, since these
laws have been enacted, there is a much greater degree of market
activity among both consumers and producers.
On the consumer side, most insurers report that retention (or
persistence) rates (the percentage of subscribers that renew, or the
length of time they stay with the insurer) have dropped significantly since the enactment of reform laws. This tends to
undermine the incentive for managed care plans to invest in preventative health and health maintenance for chronic illness. For
instance, one large national insurer reports that over 50% of its
small group subscribers turn over each year in most of our study
states, compared to normal industry averages of 15 to 25%.5 In
New York, pooled data obtained from nine large, primarily indemnity insurers shows that, in the year following reform, the portion
of each insurer's existing subscribers who terminated coverage
jumped from 22% to 31%, at the same time that the number of
subscribers new to each company leapt up 170%, resulting in essentially no gain in net enrollment. Although the number of new
subscribers roughly equaled the number of terminating subscribers
during the three years preceding reform and in the year after, the
volume of market activity roughly doubled for these nine insurers
the year after reform.

25.
Similarly, in North Carolina, the number of newly insured groups throughout the
market increased 65% from 1994 to 1996 at the same time that the total number of insured
groups has increased only 13%. See Hall, North Carolina Evaluation, supra note 12. Also, 39%
of covered groups in 1996 were new to the insurer but only 22% were previously uninsured.
See id. This indicates that most new business comes from groups that switch insurers. The
same is true in Florida, where, on average, for every 10 new subscribers that small group
insurers attracted in 1995, they lost approximately seven or eight existing subscribers. See
Hall & Wicks, Florida Evaluation, supra note 12. There are a few contrary indications, however. Most Ohio subjects felt that volatility was not a major concern in their market. See Hall,
Ohio Evaluation, supra note 15. One Ohio actuary told us that, as a marketing strategy, his
company issues "a three-year guarantee that groups will receive the new business rates," and
they found this to be "a huge success in attracting new business and in lowering the lapse
rate." Hall, Ohio Evaluation,supra note 15.
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Signs of volatility also exist on the producer side, where some insurers' small group business has fluctuated dramatically. Most
states show substantial shifts in market share among top insurers
following enactment of the small group laws, although in most
states the same insurer remains the market leader each year. These
large and sudden swings in market share can result from mistaken
pricing decisions, usually when prices are too low. We heard from
several different sources in Florida that in 1994, the first year of
market-wide guaranteed issue and modified community rating, a
number of indemnity insurers kept their rate increases very low,
expecting that others were doing the same, and later found out
that they had underpriced. As a result, these companies attracted
too many high risk enrollees. In order to offset significant losses,
they increased rates steeply, severely hurting their new enrollment
in the subsequent year, and leaving them trapped in a position
from which they might not ever be able to recover. Under different
rating and regulatory rules, they might be able to close off a block
of bad business by not selling existing policies to new subscribers,
and then creating new policies that are slightly different and
priced attractively in order to gain new enrollment. Nevertheless,
guaranteed renewal and portability, coupled with the modified
community rating rules, effectively keep insurers from segregating
their bad risk pools in this fashion, a common practice before
regulation. The law was intended to have this result because some
insurers were using more flexible rating rules to aggressively
"churn" their accounts. Eliminating this flexibility, however, also
has the effect of keeping insurers with bad risk pools from competing effectively for new business.26 As a result, one actuary explained

One Florida agent explains the result in the market:

26.
A:

I remember [just before] January 1, 1994 [when guarantee issue took
effect], one carrier that I obtained a quote from in November, this is an
eight or ten life case, and actually the rate that I got for a December 1
effective date was about 15% higher than the one in January on a guaranteed issued basis. So different companies use different philosophies
as far as getting into the market. I think the quality carriers, and this
particular carrier is a first class company, they took the attitude, well
we're going to use Group Insurance 101 from the CLU [certified life
underwriters]course and we're going to try and get as many lives on the
books as we can. We know we're going to get some of the bad, but we
want as many of the good that we can. Unfortunately what happened to
them is that it blew them out of the water and they're still really not in
the marketplace from a price standpoint as a result of the losses experienced in the eighteen months that they were really aggressively seeking
marketing share.
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that "one year's genius can be next year's bozo," because a great
new business rate that attracts lots of business will end up locking
the insurer into a rate structure that cannot sustain increased
claims without pricing the insurer out of the market for new business in succeeding years.
We heard the same story from or in regard to three other Florida insurers, one New York insurer, and one North Carolina
insurer, each with mostly or entirely indemnity policies.27 The Florida insurers attributed their inability to recover not only to the
rating rules designed to eliminate churning, but also to the fact
that Florida, apart from the small group laws, requires prior approval by the Department of Insurance for increases in average
rates, which many other states do not. These insurers complained
that rate review authority has been used to ratchet down their requests for rate increases, keeping them from recouping their full
losses even when their requests are actuarially justified. Of these
four Florida insurers, 'two have either officially or effectively withdrawn from the market, and two are still struggling to maintain
market position, although they indicate that the 'jury is still out"
on whether they will remain active in the Florida market.
Other interview subjects did not view this pricing behavior as
mistaken underpricing but instead as strategic "low-balling" or
"buying market share." They observed that new market entrants
are inherently able to offer lower premiums because, all things being equal, newer risk pools are healthier than older ones. New
subscribers are lower risks for three reasons: they are subject to
pre-existing condition exclusions; freshly underwritten groups are
uniformly healthier than a pool that contains groups that have renewed over a number of years; and people with health problems
are reluctant to switch insurance in the midst of treatment. As a
consequence of these advantages, new market entrants can quickly
gain market share by pricing aggressively. This opportunity is
Q:

Okay. So they underpriced and then they ended up getting some bad

A:

They got nailed.

business.

Hall & Wicks, F/orida Evaluation, supra note 12.
27.
One of the Florida insurers explained that "we tried like crazy" to stay in the market with guaranteed issue and modified community rating, but it "severely underpriced" in
1994, with rate increases of only 4%, because it thought others were doing the same and it
wanted to remain. But, when claims started to.come in, it found that it had "really screwed

up." The company had targeted a 72% loss ratio and ended up with 92%. "Once you make
this kind of mistake, you can't ever recover." Hall & Wicks, Florida Evaluation, supra note 12.
Similar examples were seen in New York and North Carolina. See Hall, North CarolinaEvaluation, supra note 12; Hall, New York Evaluation,supra note 14.
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especially tempting for indemnity insurers since they do not face
the same capital costs of expansion that are required to build managed care networks.
The severity of this problem is debatable. Undoubtedly, some insurers are hit harder than others, which is unfair and undermines
the goal for using competitive forces to promote true economic
efficiency. On the other hand, the effects of initial underwriting
wear off rather rapidly, and new insurers often find that they have
to raise their rates steeply after just a year or two, especially if they
underpriced initially relative to the risks they received. If so, their
enrollment will deteriorate rapidly because existing healthy subscribers will leave and the insurers will not attract new enrollees.
Moreover, rate flexibility allowed by some rating bands means that
existing insurers can respond by offering preferred rates, so long as
their normal pricing is in the middle of the bands (which may be
impossible due to other strategic concerns mentioned above).
Most insurers realize that they have limited leeway to impose rate
increases greater than the trend in new business rates and so they
are reluctant to engage in low-balling strategies to gain an artificial
advantage from new business. It is also notable that most subjects
did not report this issue in New York and Ohio, which respectively
have the most and the least stringent versions of the reform laws,
yet volatility was a concern in North Carolina and Vermont, two
states that are also at near-polar extremes in their reform stringency. It does not appear, therefore, that the pattern of market
volatility matches the pattern of restriction in the reform laws
across states, suggesting that the volatility that exists is precipitated
by the market conditions unique to each state.
Nevertheless, the reform law appears to facilitate high levels of
market activity. Portability makes it easier for subscribers to switch
insurers in order to save a few dollars. Guaranteed renewability ensures that unhealthy subscribers can keep their coverage, thereby
magnifying the difference between newly-enrolled and renewal
subscriber pools. Rating restrictions also limit the extent to which
insurers can establish different rates for different risk pools if the
benefits are the same, which prevents existing insurers from competing directly with new market entrants by offering lower rates for
newer business.
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D. Standardized Benefits
The reform law might promote price competition by creating
standardized benefit packages that make price comparisons easier,
or that serve as reference prices for insurers' other products. Historically, one problem with price shopping is that intricacies in
benefit packages make it extremely difficult to evaluate comparable products. Seemingly minor differences in benefits can account
for significant differences in price. One intended advantage of requiring insurers to offer standardized (or "statutory") benefits
plans is to eliminate such confusion over price. Alternatively, if the
plans do not sell successfully, they might at least serve as a barometer of each insurer's relative price competitiveness so purchasers
have some idea of whether the non-standard plans are a good
value.
The reform laws have not served this purpose effectively, for a
variety of reasons. First, insurers are reluctant to sell standardized
benefits, and therefore do not put much effort into the market or
service of such plans. We inquired into the source of this unpopularity, and found that, to some degree, it is simple philosophical
antipathy to government intervention in the market. Of course,
the government alone does not construct the benefit package in
most states; this work is usually done by a committee composed
mainly of insurers and agents. The government, however, does impose the mandate, so the plans carry an ideological taint for some
agents, who describe them to their clients as "state-mandated"
plans2s designed for "inferior" or "substandard" groups as
"coverage of last resort."
28.

One Florida agent explained:
A:

Q:
A:

Q:
A:

Usually when you mention to a client, "Listen we have this available
through the state of Florida," I don't know how or why but when it
comes to being provided by a government agency, people seem to be
turned off by that and [would] rather purchase health insurance
through the private sector.
OK, now, help me with [understanding] that a little bit because my understanding was that... the state actually has nothing to do with that
plan?
Yeah, but as long as people think that, perception is reality.
But do you tell them that it's a state plan?
No, no, absolutely. I just say it is the basic and standard plans that are
provided through, I'm not saying that it's the state, but it's really provided because the state has made them available.

Another Florida agent stated the point in this manner:
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Another explanation for antipathy to these plans is that both insurers and purchasers like to individualize their benefit packages.
Crafting benefit packages is a way for insurers to express their
product and corporate identity and to attempt to distinguish themselves from their competitors. Finally, we were told that
administering the statutory plans is difficult and expensive for insurers. When insurers create and modify their own benefit
packages, they make systems changes that help to automate rating
and claims processing decisions. System changes incur costs, but
without such changes, rating and claims processing is much more
time consuming. 9
These explanations from insurers compare with a more obvious
reason to disfavor the statutory plans in states such as North Carolina, Iowa, and Florida. Until 1997, statutory plans were the only
plans that were required to be guaranteed issue, yet they were subject to the same rating bands as medically underwritten plans, so
they were bound to attract higher-risk individuals.
For these reasons, insurers take a number of steps to keep a low
profile in the market with respect to these plans. First, insurers do
not actively market or advertise these plans. They have none of the
usual slick color brochures to describe them. The examples collected in this study were mostly plain, single-page summaries of
benefits. Sometimes insurers send nothing at3 all, leaving to the
agent the task of explaining the plan contents. 0
As a result of the "planned lack of response" to state-mandated
plans, one North Carolina agent observed that, from an agent's

A lot of times when we get called by people, a lot of people already have an idea of
what they want. And so, you know, you are going to give them what they want and not
try to sell them what they don't want.... You know some of that has to do with marketing. I mean you're talking the 'basic and the standard' plan with the state of
Florida. If they called it the Flamingo Plan like they do for Lotto, maybe people
would flock to it, I don't know, but, because it is very mundane-'basic and standard'Ijust don't think it has a whole lot of appeal.
Hall & Wicks, F/oridaEvaluation, supranote 12.

29.
Being forced to add another benefit plan, however minor the differences, adds to the
systems costs, not simply because it is yet another variation, but because the benefit structure
may be incompatible with the insurer's system. For instance, hospital benefits might be structured by days, dollar amounts, or diagnosis. A system designed for one structure does not
adapt well to a different structure in benefits. We did not observe, however, that inconsistencies in benefits structures are widespread or significant. See Hall, supra note 3.
30.
Ironically, some of the same tactics may also affect an insurer's favored products.
One Ohio insurer said that the move to market-wide guaranteed issue under HIPAA caused
them not to advertise the fact that their rate increase last year was less than 1% because they
want to "keep their head down" to avoid attracting bad risks. We did not hear this attitude
elsewhere in the small group market. See Hall, Ohio Evaluation, supra note 15.
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perspective, "it's as if these plans don't exist." In Florida, several
agents we spoke to who specialized in small group insurance had
not sold a single standardized plan. One of these agents actually
served on the committee that formulated the statutory benefits
packages. In both Florida and North Carolina, the statutory plans
account for less than 5% of new small group sales. The basic plan is
especially unattractive, accounting for 1/10 of 1% of new sales, in
other words, one out of a thousand new subscribers in Florida. In
North Carolina, only 282 basic plans have sold over a five-year period. One large national insurer had only thirty-two of these plans
in effect in twenty-three states at the end of 1996. Another insurer,
who specializes in small group coverage and is active nationally,
had only about two dozen groups enrolled in these plans in eighteen states.
Standardized plans are also hampered in their ability to serve a
reference pricing function that indicates an insurer's overall competitiveness. First, in some states it is difficult to learn what
insurers' rates are for these or any other plans without contacting
each insurer individually. Most states do not collect and disseminate rate information systematically (Colorado is the notable
exception among the study states). Comparative price information
is available through the state-wide purchasing cooperatives in each
state, which are sometimes used by agents to determine price competitiveness for sales outside the cooperatives. In North Carolina,
however, this is hampered by rating rules that allow these statutory
plans to be priced much differently than non-standard plans. Also,
as discussed below, insurers have adopted a variety of rating strategies that allow them to reflect the relative health risks of the
different pools of subscribers for their different products in ways
that were not intended by the reform law. Consequently, an insurer's rate for a standardized product may not reveal very much
about its rates for more popular plans.

31.
It is useful to contrast this experience with that under the Medigap reform laws,
which require standardization of the insurance policies that supplement Medicare coverage.
In this context, benefits standardization has successfully promoted price competition. See
Thomas Rice et al., The Impact of Policy Standardizationon the Medigap Market, 34 INQUIRY 106,
114 (1997). There, however, the law allows only standardized benefit plans to be sold, and so
insurers must focus their marketing efforts on those plans.
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E. Non-Price Competition

1. Product Offerings-Several forms of non-price competition will
now be discussed to determine whether small group reforms enhance the quality and range of choice in product offerings. One
public policy argument against standardized benefit plans is that,
even though they enhance price competition, mandatory plans
suppress competition and innovation in product choice and benefits design and fail to reflect the diversity of consumer tastes. On
the other hand, changes and differences in benefit designs might
be used strategically to engage in covert risk selection, by adding or
subtracting benefits that are more or less attractive to groups with
different risk profiles. It is an ongoing and probably unresolvable
debate whether and which benefit design strategies partake of either these positive or negative features. Nevertheless, it is helpful
to document and describe the variety of benefits innovations that
exist and to consider their connection with the small group laws.
Noted above is the pronounced movement to HMOs in the
small group market. This development is generally seen as efficiency-enhancing, but some commentators maintain that HMOs
accentuate adverse selection against indemnity plans, possibly effectively pricing such plans out of the market. Several indemnity
insurers argued forcefully that, under tight rating restrictions, they
cannot adequately guard against adverse selection from HMOs.
They contend, with some justification, that on average sicker people prefer indemnity and PPO products because they impose fewer
restrictions on choice of physician and covered prescriptions. If
these insurers are allowed to reflect this increased health risk only
in their average rates, then they cannot offer a competitive price to
healthier subscribers. This has the potential, the insurers claim, to
price indemnity-based products out of the market (except for
higher risks), even though there are lower risk candidates willing
to pay extra for increased choice and coverage.
The extent to which these claims are true will have to be resolved through more quantitative and direct empirical measures. A
significant reduction in the number of indemnity insurers after the
reform indicates that the claims are true. Although to some extent
this may be due simply to indemnity's lack of cost controls and subscribers' willingness to switch to managed care, the extent to which
indemnity coverage has lost favor suggests that something more is
occurring. Traditional indemnity products have all but disappeared from several of the more tightly regulated small group
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markets. Although PPO products, which are a hybrid between indemnity and managed care, are still widely available, even in tightly
regulated small group markets, their prices are increasing significantly faster than HMO products. The market testing study
discussed above shows that indemnity products are somewhat more
favored by agents in states with lighter versions of the reform laws.
Also, traditional indemnity products are virtually nonexistent in
the state-wide purchasing cooperatives. These cooperatives do,
however, offer PPO and point-of-service HMO products.
There are various strategies that insurers might adopt to counteract adverse selection. One is to make benefit packages less
attractive to people with health problems by increasing deductibles
or decreasing drug benefits. According to one Florida agent,
"[y]ou don't see a $100 deductible anymore. You don't see, or
hardly ever see, a $200 or $250 deductible.... The deductibles are
up to $300, $500. I've got them as high as $1,000.,, 32A North Caro-

lina agent complained bitterly of another benefits tactic the agent
viewed as unfair: offering good coverage for very attractive prices,
but only to the extent of the insurer's limited fee schedule, which
the agent thought was not adequately disclosed to subscribers, thus
leaving them exposed to much greater payment liability than they
realized.
Naturally, these trends and tactics might also be driven by purchasers' desire for more affordable coverage and by insurers'
concern about controlling moral hazard. Indeed, most insurers
and agents said that reductions and changes in benefits are in response to market forces, especially employers' desire to reduce
costs. Several subjects noted that a good array of benefit options is
available, and insurers continually try to innovate different and hybrid managed care structures in an effort to determine the optimal
mix between choice and cost controls. One prominent example is
the adoption by some HMOs of an "open network" design which
eliminates the requirement that patients receive permission from
primary care "gatekeepers" before seeking care from specialists
within the network.
On the other hand, the move to guaranteed issue of all small
group products prompted insurers to weed out many benefit plans
that were failing to sell on this basis or were no longer actively
marketed. Even insurers who continue to pride themselves on offering "gourmet" benefit plans are setting limits on particularly
32.
These views are partially contradicted by a nationwide sampling of employers that
found that "average deductibles declined in small firms but grew in large firms." Jensen et
al., supra note 11, at 132.
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high cost items such as in vitro fertilization and designer drugs that
insurers believe form the basis for adverse selection. One insurer
said it is reluctant to try out new benefit structures, such as medical
savings accounts and disease management programs, in states
where rating rules are less forgiving of possible pricing mistakes
because it is difficult to know for certain what impact these
changes will have on costs and on purchasers' selection decisions.
From another perspective, one might conclude there is too
much choice in benefit packages, leading to confusion and market
segmentation. An examination of a large number of sales brochures reveals that much of insurers' strategic market positioning
is focused on minor differences in benefit packages. Insurers tout a
dizzying array of ways to mix and match various components of
coverage such as deductibles, copayment levels, maximum payouts,
and various riders for prescription drug benefits or mental health
coverage. Again, this might be a procompetitive response to varying consumer tastes, or a strategic attempt to frustrate price
comparison to generate favorable selection by offering benefits
that have greater or lesser appeal to different risk groups. Most
agents took the benign view, but others spoke of "little gimmicks
that [insurers] can put in the contract." One example, which we
heard about or witnessed in several states, is offering health club
membership as a way to attract health-conscious subscribers. Another possible example of this tactic is the highly visible decision by
Oxford Health Plan to offer coverage for alternative or holistic
therapies. Both these examples, however, are subject to the benign
interpretation as well.33 Also, a number of other agents thought
that differences in benefits packages had narrowed since reform.
2. Quality Competition---So far, we have seen that price and

product competition appear to be thriving in the small group market. Noticeably absent is any form of competition based on
outcome measures of quality, measured through criteria such as
33.
One New York agent, for instance, attributed Oxford's decision to a savvy marketing strategy to appeal to diverse ethnic groups:
I think Oxford has been very intelligent. As of late ... they have gone to alternative
medicines. So they are starting to say we are willing to cover and promote coverage by
chiropractors or acupuncturists who are properly licensed and so forth. It's an incredibly smart move, I think especially given the multiplicity of ethnic makeup of the
New York area.... So that kind of diversity is very crucial to their marketing plan,
and by Oxford going to alternative medicines, it's recognizing that there are other
forms of medicine in other parts of the world that are very common and popular and
they want to be including those in their realm.
Hall, New York Evaluation,supra note 14.
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patient satisfaction, recovery times, and overall health status following treatment. Naturally, this is relevant only to HMOs because
indemnity insurers are not in a position to monitor or influence
the quality of care, and one of the selling points of indemnity coverage is that subscribers are free to make their own decisions about
which are the best providers. Given the penetration of HMOs,
however, one might expect at least some competitive focus on
quality of care measures. We reviewed HMOs' sales literature targeted to the small group market and found almost no reference to
outcome measures of quality such as those developed by National
Committee on Quality Assurance, even though the committee accredits HMOs. At most, there were passing generic references to
the quality of providers in the network. The focus of the sales literature is on the particulars of the benefit packages, and for
HMOs, on the composition of the network. In the vocabulary of
most agents, "quality" refers to the quality of the benefits, that is,
how comprehensive they are, and to the quality of the insurers'
claims service, that is, how promptly and easily they pay claims, not
to the quality of care delivered.
The same is true for the most part even within the purchasing
cooperatives. Purchasing cooperatives are supposed to embody the
pure form of managed competition that focuses competition precisely on the trade-off between price and outcomes-based quality.
Yet, the cooperatives in each of the study states, which are among
the largest and most sophisticated in the country, have only recently considered the possibility of using simple patient satisfaction
measures. The use of more detailed outcomes measures is still a
topic to
be studied for implementation at an undefined future
4
point.3
We inquired of agents about the lack of emphasis on objective
measures of quality and received the following explanations. First,
with employers making the decision, cost is still the critical issue.
Employers are satisfied with quality if their personal physician is in
the network; other than that, the quality of the network overall is

34.
In one instance, the purchasing cooperative in Cleveland asked one insurer to
drop a hospital from its network based on outcomes and cost information, and this coop is
collecting this information from other hospitals, but this information is being used only to
formulate the provider network, not to assist employers and employees in choosing insurance. See Hall, Ohio Evaluation, supra note 15. A purchasing cooperative administrator in
Florida expressed his disappointment that he came to the job thinking he would be a reformer and innovator, working with techniques such as outcomes measurement of quality,
but he quickly discovered that his main job is to sell as much insurance as possible and to
leave the high-minded ideals for a future time when there are sufficient enrollees to justify
the effort. See Hall & Wicks, FloridaEvaluation,supra note 12.
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not their central concern.35 These views are not dissimilar to those
expressed by benefits managers for large employers, despite their
greater resources and sophistication. 36 These factors are also essentially the same ones that employees indicate (through focus
groups) are the most important when they choose among multiple
options. Therefore, the small group market may be efficiently
producing the type of information that consumers actually want,
even if it is not producing the information some reformers seek.
The absence of overt use of objective quality measures in small
group marketing literature and employers' decisions does not
mean this information does not shape insurers' behavior. This information increasingly exists in the large group market and in the
public domain, and insurers are acutely sensitive and responsive to
it, even though few purchasers are demonstrably influenced by it.3 8
Economic theory postulates that quality or price information affects competitive behavior if even only a few, sophisticated market
leaders use it in their purchasing decisions. Also, as a matter of
corporate pride or identity, insurers naturally do not want to be
ranked below their competitors, so they work hard to improve their
rankings, even if they do not actively use the rankings in their marketing schemes.
35.

This was one agent's explanation:

Q:

Academic theorists would like to see the competitive focus on pure outcomes measures and patient satisfaction and stuff like that. You know,
"We're not only cheaper but we're better in terms of quality of care, or
we may be a little bit more expensive but it's worth it because if you
come here you'll end up living longer and feeling better." Do you see
that kind of focus emerging in the small group market?

A:

I think that's what they'll say.... In theory that's wonderful. I don't
think it's going to be reality though. Carriers, in my opinion, are really
looking at bottom line. How much does it cost to give... quality care.
Quality care is defined by them how inexpensively can we do it for
them.... Another thing that people look at is, when they get onto a
plan, I think the first thing that most people do is check to see if their
doctor is on the plan. Otherwise they kind of hem and haw a little bit.
And in group plans it's the old adage, he who has the gold, makes the
rules. The first thing that the decision maker is going to do is see if his
or her doctor is on the plan and if not they might look at somebody else.

Hall, New York Evaluation, supra note 14.
36.
SeeJudith H. Hibbard et al., Choosing a Health Plan:Do Large Employers Use the Data?,
HEALTH AlT., Nov./Dec. 1997, at 172, 177 (finding that cost measures may outweigh the
more vague quality measures in the decision-making process of large scale purchasers).
37.
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The small group laws, however, create a potential barrier to aggressive quality competition by encouraging insurers to keep a low
profile with respect to higher risk subscribers in a guaranteed issue
environment. According to a New York agent:
I think the [insurance] companies are in a quandary. Here
they are, they are forced to offer health insurance. If their
service is great and their named reputation and all that is
wonderful, everyone who is ill is going to go to them. If their
service is lousy, they're not going to get the clients and therefore their rate is going to be even higher because they don't
have enough client base to support.
Similarly, the possibility that quality advertising might be used
against plans in litigation over errors in treatment could deter
plans from promoting themselves based on quality records.
F. Rating Games and Risk Selection

The following picture emerges from the analysis so far:
although small group market reforms have been successful on a
number of fronts, they have not produced the economic ideal envisioned by some reformers. Even though insurers do not use risk
selection to the same extent as before, virtually all of our interview
subjects contend that risk selection remains- an important, and
perhaps the most important, factor in determining insurers' profitability. This clouds, to a considerable extent, the ability of
consumers to determine from a plan's price the underlying efficiency in the form of insurance or the delivery of medical care.
There are strong indications that price differences in the small
group market are still determined by differences in risk pools. Risk
differentials can be seen in statistics on average claims per enrollee. Although differences among insurers in any one year in average
claims per enrollee reflect in part differences in benefit packages,
trends in average claims from year to year for a given insurermore

clearly point to changes in the composition of the risk pool. In
most states, we observed substantial differences in these trends,
with some insurers increasing much more rapidly than others. This
is confirmed by an analysis performed by the Lewin Group, which
surveyed twenty small group insurers in Florida to determine the
extent of risk differentials. Using the risk adjustment methodology
from the California purchasing cooperative, these researchers
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determined, based on 1995 information, that among the dozen
Florida insurers they surveyed (which are not the same as the top
dozen in the market), differences in risk factors were three times
greater than what are accounted for in the modified community
rating factors.
Differences of this magnitude exist despite the risk adjustment
and reinsurance mechanisms that companies use in each of these
states. These mechanisms are intended to smooth out risk differentials and counteract incentives to engage in risk selection, but for
reasons that are beyond the scope of this paper, they do not appear to be having their full intended effect.
Large differences in risk pools continue to exist for a variety of
possible reasons. First, insurers entered the reformed market with
lower or higher risk pools and these historical patterns may have
persisted. Second, insurers have available a number of covert risk
selection techniques which may result in some companies systematically attracting better risks. Some of these techniques are
perfectly legitimate, such as crafting benefit packages to appeal to
healthier subscribers; others are not legitimate or are of questionable legality, such as field underwriting. Third, risk differentials
may exist by virtue of subscribers' natural preferences, such as the
tendency of sicker people to prefer one kind of plan or set of
benefits over another, or the reluctance of sicker subscribers to
switch insurers, with a resulting advantage for newer market entrants. There is no rigorous way to disentangle these possibilities,
but to a notable extent, insurers are still able to engage in purposeful risk selection strategies. One industry source stated that
regulators "can't hold a candle" to the creative abilities of insurers
to encourage risk selection.
Insurers still compete considerably on their medical underwriting abilities, despite the efforts of reforms to minimize medical
underwriting. First, until 1997 a number of states still allowed insurers to decline coverage for their primary plans. Even following
HIPAA, which requires that all small group plans be guaranteed
issue, risk rating still occurs in states with rating bands to almost
the same extent as before reforms because of the considerable
medical underwriting that is required to make full use of the flexibility in the rating bands. A number of HMO and Blue Cross plans
told us that they started using their rating flexibility much more
aggressively once HIPAA required them to guarantee issue all of
their plans, so that now they devote more focus to making finegrained distinctions through medical underwriting than they did
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before these reforms. s9 Underwriting expertise is also required to
determine whether to reinsure. Accuracy in these endeavors still
determines profitability to a considerable extent.
Moreover, insurers have developed a number of techniques that
allow them to engage in a greater degree of risk rating than is apparent from the rating bands. Rating bands that allow a +/- spread
based on health risk or claims experience suggest that rates for one
plan could never be more than the stated percentage higher than
average rates, but that is not the case. In order to make maximum
use of the allowable spread between high and low risks, many actuaries rate standard-risk applicants near the bottom end of the
spread, not the middle, thereby allowing almost twice as much increase for poor health status than appears allowable from the
bands. °
We also heard that insurers have been able to manipulate the
rating factors for benefits differences to produce greater health
risk differentials than the rating rules allow. Valuing benefit differences among plans requires an exercise of actuarial judgment for
which there are different techniques. One technique is to declare
simply that benefits are worth the claims costs they generate, so
that different benefit packages are rated according to the claims
experience for the pool of subscribers to each package. The problem with this approach is that the differences in benefits are
measured by the health risk of the populations that purchase
them. If some plans are more attractive to healthier or sicker populations, then the claims experience will reflect underlying health
risk as well as benefit differences. Using simple claims experience
can result in anomalies such as placing a higher actuarial value on
a benefits package that objectively is less rich. For instance, if two
plans are identical except that Plan B offers free membership in a
health club, Plan B should be more expensive but, measured by
39.
One Ohio agent expressed frustration that insurers issue quotes at preferred rates
based on perfect risks but then revert to higher standard rates once underwriting is completed: "They come in with a proposal that is too good to be true and in most cases it is. And
the only way to qualify for it is that you have to be Jesus Christ yourself and then they would
probably look hard at holes in the hands and all that." See Hall, Ohio Evaluation, supra note
15.
40.
For example, with +/- 20% bands, one might think that a rate of $100 for standardrisk subscribers would yield a spread of rates from $80 to $120 for low and high risk subscribers. However, if an insurer uses $100 as its lowest rate by refusing to issue any preferred
rates, it could set its mid-point at $125 and charge high risks up to $150, 50% more than
standard, for identical coverage and demographics. See Hall, supra note 3 (describing how
insurers can influence rating bands in order to increase rates). Even more extreme possibilities exist in Ohio, where bands are +/-35%, producing a total potential spread of 108%
(1.35/.65) based, on individual health risk, in addition to demographic and benefits factors.
See Hall, Ohio Evaluation, supra note 15.
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claims experience, this difference will likely be muted, or reversed,
since health-conscious subscribers will likely gravitate toward the
free membership. Used in a different manner, claims-based measures of benefits differences can be used to exaggerate the actuarial
value of different deductible levels. A plan with a $100 deductible
is worth more than an identical one with a $500 deductible, but
the difference is certainly not more than $400. However, measured
purely by claims experience, the low-deductible plan might in fact
produce an actuarial measure greater than the difference in the
deductibles because higher risks gravitate toward richer benefits.
The same technique could be used in states where only some plans
are guaranteed issue to price those plans considerably higher than
medically underwritten plans.
We in fact observed actuarial anomalies of this nature in several
states. 41 For instance, one New York actuary admitted their point-ofservice HMO plan costs more than a PPO indemnity plan, whereas
the pure benefits effect should be the opposite. Other actuaries
said that they do not rate benefit differences according to productspecific claims experience because this is improper, contrary to the
law, or prohibited by regulators. It does not appear, however, that
insurance regulators closely scrutinize rate filings or actuarial certifications in this regard. Actuarial certifications verify compliance
with the rating rules only in general terms and do not specify how
the actuaries derive or support various rating factors. We found no
indication that the regulators request or scrutinize the data and
actuarial theories that underlie these certifications. One regulator
conceded that his agency is "willing to take almost anything" based
on this actuarial certification.
Insurers are also able to engage in risk selection through a variety of techniques known as "field underwriting." This term refers
to a practice of encouraging agents rather than insurers to screen
out applicants they know or suspect are higher risks. This is a legitimate practice in many parts of the insurance industry such as
property, casualty, and life, but for health insurance in a guaranteed issue environment, field underwriting of this sort is not
legitimate and violates the statutory requirement of fair marketing.
41.
For instance, the rates for the statutory plans in North Carolina, which provide
somewhat leaner benefits than most insurers' medically underwritten plans, nevertheless
were priced higher than the underwritten coverage for many insurers. The rate differences
were sometimes dramatic. One insurer charged $209 for the standard statutory plan but
only $71 for its underwritten plan with more generous benefits. For another, the rates were
$145 for standard benefits versus $70 for the more generous underwritten plan, and there
were several other examples of a similar magnitude. See Hall, North CarolinaEvaluation, supra
note 12.
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Nevertheless, interview subjects in every state confirmed that field
underwriting occurs to some degree, largely through subtle suggestions and pressure on agents rather than through more overt
means. This makes it difficult to detect with the resources available
to regulators. Moreover, in some states, notably Ohio and Florida,
regulators allow insurers to influence agents directly by adjusting
their commission levels according to the attractiveness of the business generated by different agents.
Most agents claimed these tactics do not influence their judgment regarding where to send high risk applicants. Nevertheless,
whether through agents, through selective marketing, or simply
through chance, the distribution of high risk cases is highly uneven
among insurers. This can be seen in Ohio, for instance, where
prior to HIPAA small group indemnity insurers accepted open enrollment applicants only until they filled a quota based on their
market share of underwritten plans. In 1995, one insurer reached
61% of its open enrollment quota, another one reached 12%, and
a third reached only 1%. The remaining several dozen insurers
sold no open enrollment policies at all that year. Similarly, in
North Carolina, statutory plan (guaranteed issue) enrollees in 1996
-accounted for almost 7% of one HMO's small group enrollment
and more than 2% of two other insurers' small group enrollment,
but all of the other top insurers had less than half of 1% of their
enrollment in guaranteed issue plans.

CONCLUSION

How concerned should we be that competition in the small
group market does not fit the model of economic efficiency intended by some reformers? Answers to that question obviously vary
widely depending on one's social and economic ideology. Those
who favor unconstrained competition or who oppose managed
care can be glad that market reforms allow competition based on
risk selection. For those who favor nationalized health insurance or
mandated purchase of insurance, these findings may supply considerable ammunition against the current voluntary private system.
It is also possible, however, to view these findings from a middle
ground that sees their moderated virtues. The movement toward
managed care represents a profound shift in the nature of competition in the small group market, and methods of competing based
on risk selection are now greatly reduced in some states. Also, the
small group market in all states remains vibrantly price competitive
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and innovative in product development, despite rather intensive
regulatory intervention.
The matter of most concern is the considerable number of
techniques that insurers still use to engage in strategic risk selection or to avoid adverse selection. It is naive to think that the
incentives for risk selection will ever be fully controlled within a
competitive insurance market. Although this is a goal of some
market reformers, others take a more moderate approach to the
social and economic merits of risk selection. Under this contrary
view, some degree of risk selection may be desirable because this
generates price signals about the costs of unhealthy behavior and
lifestyle choices. Risk selection also helps to lubricate the moving
parts of the market machinery by counteracting adverse selection.
The micro-management of insurers' and agents' strategic decisions
and interactions required to eliminate risk selection would overwhelm regulators and impose a huge administrative cost, as well as
suppress valuable forms of competitive innovation.2
Dilemmas like this confront us at every turn. Portability facilitates price and product competition but undermines insurers'
incentive to invest in their subscribers' long-term health. Standardizing coverage promotes price comparability but suppresses
product innovation. Guaranteed issue and community rating reduce available risk selection techniques at the same time they
amplify the incentive to engage in risk selection. Purchasing cooperatives bring to small employers some of the sophistication and
bargaining clout enjoyed by large employers but they threaten to
undermine the valued role that insurance agents play in assisting
purchasers. If there is one thing this study clearly establishes, it is
that finding the optimal balance among these and other competing objectives is a demanding endeavor, one that reformers have
initiated with some success but that is far from complete.

For instance, the large purchasing cooperative in Cleveland is dominated by one
42.
insurer because the coop administrators are afraid that letting in others would create too
much administrative policing, resulting in risk-selection behavior as insurers "ate each
other's lunch chasing after the good accounts." Hall, Ohio Evaluation,supra note 15.

